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Abstract 
 
New and emergent digital technologies pose particular problems for regulators. The utility of 
these technologies is maximised by linking them to the Internet. Internet technology though 
does not respect the borders of nation states. As a result the traditional legitimacy of the 
Westphalian state to regulate activity within its jurisdictional borders is undermined. This has led 
to the development of a number of competing cyber-regulatory models that attempt to bridge the 
gap between traditional Westphalian governance and the new reality of the global digital space. 
Many of these, although not all, fit within post-Westphalian literature. Some, drawing from 
globalisation and post-Westphalian models, seek to identify and deploy key governance nodes. 
Such models identify roles for non-state actors, private corporations and supranational 
governance institutions. The unhappy relationship between old-world, Westphalian legal 
governance and new-world post-Westphalian governance is an area of continuing conflict and is 
the backdrop to this chapter which identifies and discusses a number of case studies in digital 
governance.  
Introduction 
 
Traditional, Nodal, and Transnational Governance Models  
 
Traditional models of regulation and governance draw authority from the sovereign power of the 
state and convert that authority into an action in regulation or in governance.1 As Morgan & 
Yeung outline in their classic Introduction to Law and Regulation (Morgan & Yeung 2007) 
traditional models of regulation and governance begin from the cybernetics principle. Such a 
model begins with three components of a control system: capacity for standard setting; capacity 
for information gathering; and capacity for behaviour modification. In essence a model for 
regulation or for governance is predicated upon a standard-setting authority, a monitoring 
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system which detects deviation from these standards and a form of corrective action to remedy 
deviation. Lawyers tend to more commonly apply a narrow definition of regulation ³$W WKHLU
narrowest, definitions of regulation tend to centre on deliberate attempts by the state to 
influence socially valuable behaviour which may have adverse side-effects by establishing, 
PRQLWRULQJDQGHQIRUFLQJ OHJDO UXOHV´ (Morgan & Yeung, 2007: 3). Some, however, employ a 
wider definition of what some may more properly suggest is governance ³$W LWV EURDGHVW
regulation is seen as encompassing all forms of social control, whether intentional or not, and 
whether imposed by WKHVWDWHRURWKHUVRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´ (Morgan & Yeung 2007: 3-4) The true 
nature of regulation and governance, as applied in the real world, is probably closer to the latter 
than the former, but the study of such an ill-defined sphere would be nigh-on impossible as 
almost any social action by any institution could be defined as a regulatory act. Thus studies of 
regulation and governance have developed a number of refinements and supplementary 
models. Many such as risk based regulation (Black, 2010) and responsive regulation (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992; Baldwin & Black 2008) are modelled upon specific relationships between an 
industry or sector and its regulator. They assume commonality of experience and language: in 
essence these approaches are institutional approaches to both regulation and governance. 
Another set of models examines the social structures of regulation and governance such as 
libertarian paternalism and empirical regulation (Sunstein & Thaler 2003; Sunstein 2011), and 
³VPDUW´UHJXODWLRQ (Gunningham et al 1998). These are valuable additions to both the normative 
cybernetic model and the risk/responsive institutional models. They are not particularly helpful to 
the current analysis as their focus is on responses of the social actor in the regulatory matrix 
whereas the instant analysis is on technology and technological actors. Therefore, although we 
acknowledge the importance these contributions make to wider discourse on regulation and 
governance, and in particular their contribution by acknowledging the potential exploitation of 
biases and heuristics in human actors, we do not intend here to examine such socially mediated 
forms of regulation.2  
 
Some regulatory models do capture the role played by technology as an actor. The most 
relevant are applications of Actor-Network Theory or Science and Technology Studies (Latour 
2005; Kuhn 1962). Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is often associated with Michel Callon and 
Bruno Latour and is closely linked to the work of the Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation, Paris. 
It was not developed particularly to deal with computer networks (Latour, 1996) but rather was 
designed to model the semiotic relationships between all actants in a network human or non-
human. It can be extremely difficult to model without years of study but a good and simple 
 3 
GHVFULSWLRQLVJLYHQE\2OH+DQVHWKDQG(ULF0RQWHLUR³:KHQJRLQJDERXWGRLQJ\RXUEXVLQHVV
- driving your car or writing a document using a word-processor - there are a lot of things that 
influence how you do it. For instance, when driving a car, you are influenced by traffic 
UHJXODWLRQV SULRU GULYLQJ H[SHULHQFH DQG WKH FDU¶V PDQRHXYULQJ DELOLWLHV WKH XVH RI D ZRUG-
processor is influenced by earlier experience using it, the functionality of the word-processor 
and so forth. All of these factors are related or connected to how you act. You do not go about 
doing your business in a total vacuum but rather under the influence of a wide range of 
surrounding factors. The act you are carrying out and all of these influencing factors should be 
considered together. This is exactly what the term actor network accomplishes. An actor 
network, then, is the act linked together with all of its influencing factors (which again are 
linked), producing a network. An actor network consists of and links together both technical and 
non-WHFKQLFDO HOHPHQWV 1RW RQO\ WKH FDU¶V PRWRU FDSDFLW\ EXW DOVR \RXU GULYLQJ WUDLQLQJ
LQIOXHQFH \RXU GULYLQJ +HQFH $17 WDONVDERXW WKH KHWHURJHQHRXV QDWXUH RI DFWRU QHWZRUNV´
(Hanseth & Monteiro, 1998, 96-97) As can be seen this is a very attractive model for anyone 
working in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) field including those of us 
working in ICT regulation or governance as it helps model the role and influence of non-human 
actors in the network and arguably allows for better modelling of the response of human actors 
to attempts to regulate their activity. ANT is in itself a subset or perhaps a development 
depending upon your point of view of Science and Technology Studies (STS). This is the rather 
broader study of the inter-relationship between scientific discovery and advancement and 
external social, political and cultural influences. This covers many fields from technological 
determinism to modernity and deliberative democracy. Much modern structuring of STS owes a 
debt to the work of Thomas Kuhn and in particular his work The Structure of scientific 
Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962). Kuhn posited the thesis that revolutionary changes in scientific 
theories may be attributed to changes in underlying intellectual paradigms. For those of us 
ZRUNLQJ LQ WKH ,&7 ILHOG LW LV QRW .XKQ¶V WKHVLV LWVHOI ZKLFK LV SDUWLFXODUO\ DSSHDOLQJ EXW WKH
question of technological determinism which also plays a vital role in STS theory and in 
particular the distinction between hard and soft determinism. Hard determinists see technology 
as a driving force in societal development. According to this view of determinism we organise 
ourselves to meet the needs of technology and the outcome of this organisation is beyond our 
control or we do not have the freedom to make a choice regarding the outcome (Ellul, 1954). 
This may be seen as an influencing factor in movements such as Cyberpaternalism. Soft 
determinists still subscribe to the fact that technology is a guiding force in our evolution, but 
would maintain that we have a chance to make decisions regarding the outcomes of a situation. 
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This is reflected in movements such as Network Communitarianism (Murray, 2007).  A third 
application of STS in the ICT field is of course media determinism which was famously 
discussed by Marshall McLuhan in his 1964 book Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
DQGLQZKLFKKHVHWRXWWKHIDPRXVSKUDVH³WKHPHGLXPLVWKHPHVVDJH´ 
 
The application of both ANT and STS theories to ICT regulation and governance is an area 
already extremely well developed with excellent work available (Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Gutwirth 
et al 2008; DeNardis 2014). Due to the already established nature of the literature in this area 
we do not propose to apply ANT or STS theory in this chapter; instead the tools to be applied in 
this analysis are to be found in nodal or decentred governance and transnational governance or 
regulation. Nodal or decentred governance is found in the work of Clifford Shearing (Shearing & 
Wood 2003), Peter Drahos (Burris et al 2005) and Julia Black (Black 2001). In essence it is the 
acknowledgement that the regulatory environment has many more active participants than is 
recognised by traditional cybernetic theory. As Julia Black observes, ³7KH GHFHQWUHG
understanding of regulation is based on slightly different diagnoses of regulatory failure, 
diagnoses which are based on, and give rise to, a changed understanding of the nature of 
society, of government, and of the relationship between them. The first aspect is complexity. 
Complexity refers both to causal complexity, and to the complexity of interactions between 
actors in society (or systems, if one signs up to systems theory). There is a recognition that 
social problems are the result of various interacting factors, not all of which may be known, the 
nature and relevance of which changes over time, and the interaction between which will be 
RQO\LPSHUIHFWO\XQGHUVWRRG´ (Black 2001: 106-7). The decentring analysis must also be placed 
within globalisation and the transnational aspect of modern governance/regulation. Again Black 
DFNQRZOHGJHVWKLV³'HFHQWULQJ LVDOVRXVHGWRGHVFULEHFKDQJHVRFFXUULQJZLWKLQJRYHUQPHQW
and administration: the internal fragmentation of the tasks of policy formation and 
implementation. Decentring is further used to express observations (and less so the normative 
goal) that governments are constrained in their actions, and that they are as much acted upon 
as they are actors. Decentring is thus part of the globalization debate on one hand, and of the 
debate on the developments of mezzo-levels of government (regionalism, devolution, 
federalism) on the other´ (Black 2001: 104) The integration of decentred/nodal governance with 
ANT or STS theory gives a strong regulatory model for the regulation of emergent digital 
technologies (Teubner 2006; Koops et al 2010; Sartor 2009). It is the foundation of the cyber-
collectivist, or Cyberpaternalist, movement that took root in East-coast US institutions and which 
has become dominant in our understanding of cyber-governance (Lessig 2006; Wu & Goldsmith 
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2006; Zittrain 2008). Central to this thesis is the role of code, or to widen the analysis from 
merely internet-enabled technologies, the standards and protocols employed by digital 
technologies of all types. Cyberpaternalists believe that the guidance of the state, or an elite, 
achieved through manipulation of software code or network hardware, is necessary to prevent 
cyberspace from becoming anarchic or simply inefficient (Lessig 2006: 120-37; Zittrain 2008: 
11-19, 101-26). 7KLV LV PRVW IDPRXVO\ FDSWXUHG E\ /DZUHQFH /HVVLJ¶V model of regulation 
whereby he identified four regulatory modalities - law, social norms, architecture or design and 
markets (Lessig 2006: 122-3). These modalities act as constraints on action or behaviour and 
within the plastic environment of the digital space where almost all aspects of the environment 
may be altered by human intervention, Lessig identifies architecture, or code, as the key 
modality (Lessig 2006: 83-119). As Tim Wu observed LQGLVFXVVLQJ/HVVLJ¶VZRUN³7KHUHDVRQ
that code matters for law at all is its capability to define behavior on a mass scale. This 
capability can mean constraints on behavior, in which case code regulates. But it can also mean 
shaping behavior into legally advantageous forms´ (Wu 2003: 707-8). Lessig identifies a shift in 
regulatory ability and power in this environment. The power and plasticity of code makes it the 
pre-HPLQHQWFRQWUROPHFKDQLVPIRUGLJLWDO WHFKQRORJLHVDV³FRde or software or architecture or 
protocols [which] set [the] features of the [digital space] are selected by code writers. They 
constrain some behavior by making other behavior possible or impossible. The code embeds 
certain values or makes certain values LPSRVVLEOH´ (Lessig 2006: 125). He identifies two 
FRPSHWLQJUHJXODWRU\ LQWHUHVWV(DVW&RDVWFRGHPDNHUV ³WKH µFRGH¶ WKDW&RQJUHVVHQDFWVDQ
endless array of statutes that say in words how to behave. Some statutes direct people; others 
direct companies; some direct bureaucrats. The technique is as old as government itself: using 
FRPPDQGVWRFRQWURO,QRXUFRXQWU\LWLVDSULPDULO\(DVW&RDVW:DVKLQJWRQ'&DFWLYLW\´DQG
:HVW&RDVWFRGHPDNHUV³WKHFRGHWKDWFRGHZULWHUV µHQDFW¶²the instructions imbedded in the 
software and hardware that make cyberspace work´ (Lessig 2006: 72). Often they will work in 
concert with traditional, or East Coast, codemakers mandating technical standards from the 
technical community. Sometimes they work in parallel with the same values driving both East 
Coast and West Coast code. Occasionally they will come into conflict and in some cases East 
Coast code prevails, in others West Coast code survives. What Lessig identified more than 
anything though was the contribution of the West Coast codemaker: this was another example 
of the developing nodal or decentralised model of regulation but importantly Lessig put 
considerable regulatory power into the hands of non-state actors. 
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Non-State Actors in the Technology Sectors 
 
As digital technologies have moved from the lab to the home, and more recently to the world 
around us through mobile and wearable digital technology, non-state actors have come out from 
Silicon Valley and the US west coast to inhabit and represent almost all areas of society. In this 
chapter we have categorised them into four classifications: (i) Business Actors (ii) Transnational 
Multi-State Actors (iii) Transnational Private Actors and (iv) Civil Society Groups. Each has a 
particular value set and unique ability to influence key regulatory designers (East Coast and 
West Coast regulators). Although none of these have the ability to directly make policy, law, or 
develop underlying architectures of control, each actor has the ability to access those who do 
have that ability and each have a particular method or means of influence.  
 
The first group, business actors, are made up of those technology companies who have the 
ability to directly influence the design or code of emergent technologies including actual code 
developers, such as Microsoft, Google and Apple; hardware developers, such as Sony or LG, 
and media and content companies such as Fox, Disney or UMG. The tools available to 
business actors are varied. Those who have direct access to software or hardware design may 
directly manipulate design or code to their advantage. Others may find that due to their 
intermediary role, such as Internet Service Providers or search engines, they become proxy 
regulators for the interests of others (Laidlaw 2015). Developers of new platforms and 
technologies often find themselves quickly in a dominant position, particularly if the technology 
is both disruptive and widely adopted. In the last twenty years Google have developed a 
dominant position in a number of technology sectors, but in particular in search, while Apple had 
(but may no longer have) dominance in digital music distribution. Currently Spotify seems to 
hold the leading position in streaming music distribution against strong competition in the form 
of Apple Music, Google Play Music and Amazon Prime Music, while NetFlix, Hulu and Amazon 
fight for dominance in streaming video distribution. The need for content suppliers to be on 
these dominant platforms gives these companies considerable market power, a position that it 
takes competition authorities a considerable time to address, as we shall see in the discussion 
below of the Microsoft dominance cases.  
 
Our second group, transnational multi-state actors, reflect the global reach of new and emergent 
technologies: markets for new technologies are worldwide. As a result, and as predicted by 
Johnson & Post (Johnson & Post 1996), the ability of nation states to legitimately and effectively 
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regulate emergent technologies is limited. This enhances the role of supranational organisations 
like the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN). The EU is taking the lead in a number 
of areas of emergent technology, in particular privacy and data privacy and in abuse of 
dominance and more widely through its Digital Agenda for Europe. UN bodies also play a key 
shaping role. Most obviously through the World Summit on the Information Society, and the 
International Telecommunications Union Internet Policy and Governance Programme.3 Finally 
there are multilateral initiatives such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
which proposes common standards in a number of technology industries including ICTs, 
Pharmaceuticals, engineering and medical devices. It is the second multilateral trade treaty 
following on from the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. These treaties are proving to be 
highly controversial with civil society groups and may be interpreted as an attempt to secure the 
dominance of current technology providers against possible emergent technologies.  
 
The third group are transnational private actors. These are private regulatory organisations, as 
distinct from business actors, which have either organically developed into a regulatory role 
from a technical design or self-regulatory role, such as the Internet Architecture Board and the 
World Wide Web Consortium, or bodies created to fill a vacuum caused by the transnational 
nature of new and emergent technology such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN). As with transnational multi-state actors a more recent development is 
the design of multi-stakeholder principles. These bodies draw authority and capacity to regulate 
from a number of sources. The Internet Architecture Board and the World Wide Web 
Consortium are essentially technocracies supported by the engineers who develop and make 
use of their systems. ICANN receives formal authority from two Memoranda of Understanding 
with the US Department of Commerce and the Internet Engineering Task Force,4 a not 
uncontroversial position (Hunter 2002-03).  
 
Finally we must acknowledge the role of civil society groups. One aspect of internet-enabled 
technologies is that as commerce becomes global so does activism and civil society. Leading 
civil society groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Open Rights Group, 
have found themselves supplemented by a number of international multi-issue and single issue 
civil society groups such as Privacy International, GovLab, Drones Watch, Stop the Cyborgs 
and many more. Although not able to directly develop regulation or governance these groups 
through steady pressure can influence the development and deployment of new and emergent 
technology. Privacy International have successfully, along with other international civil society 
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groups, influenced the EU to classify some digital surveillance technologies as dual-use for the 
purpose of exportation,5 while Stop the Cyborgs, through a long and vocal campaign which 
DWWUDFWHGPXFKQHJDWLYHPHGLDDWWHQWLRQXQGRXEWHGO\FRQWULEXWHGWR*RRJOH¶VHYHQWXDOdecision 
not to fully commercialise the explorer version Google Glass.6  
 
Through a series of case studies this chapter examines how each of these groups plays a role 
in the development of governance for new and emergent technologies, demonstrating the role 
and contribution of non-state nodes of governance in emergent digital technologies. The first 
case study looks at business actors, and in particular the role of Internet Intermediaries (IIs) 
such as Google, Facebook and key ISPs such as BT or Sky, in controlling access to content 
online. As intermediary gatekeepers (Laidlaw 2015) they have a particular role, and some may 
argue commensurate responsibility, in allowing for the free flow of information from one part of 
the network to another. Their unique gatekeeper position has also led to them being identified 
by states as a key regulatory node targeted by them as proxy regulators. The second case 
study examines the particular role of transnational multi-state public bodies such as the United 
Nations and the European Union (EU). Our examination of this area centres upon the role of the 
EU in competition law or anti-trust. We examine the Microsoft series of cases which have seen 
some of the largest fines in corporate history levied. These may also be considered alongside 
the current EU Google investigations that include one on the Google Shopping marketplace and 
one on the Android operating system and app store. Our third case study examines 
transnational standards setting bodies and in particular the role of ICANN, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, in managing the generic top-level domain name 
space (gTLD). This is a space of considerable commercial value and some public interest. 
ICANN have over the years been required to manage a number of controversial programmes to 
expand access to the gTLD and we will examine two procedures in some detail, the .xxx space 
and the new top-level domain process (new gTLD). Finally we will examine the role of civil 
society groups in this sphere and in particular the degree of success achieved by civil society 
groups in the digital privacy sphere with particular attention to the role of Digital Rights Ireland 
and other European privacy groups in the series of challenges brought in response to the EU 
Data Retention Directive (Dir. 2006/24/EC). 
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Business Actors: Intermediaries as Proxy Regulators 
Gatekeepers 
 
Internet Intermediaries (IIs) ± Internet Service Providers (ISPs), hosting providers, search 
engines, payment platforms and participatory platforms (such as social media platforms), 
exercise key functions in their role as gatekeepers in the online environment (Laidlaw 2015). 
:KLOH,,VSURYLGHHVVHQWLDOWRROVWKDW³HQDEOHWKH,QWHUQHWWRGULYHHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO
GHYHORSPHQW´ they may also ³EH PLVXVHG IRU KDUPIXO RU LOOHJDO SXUSRVHV VXFK DV WKH
dissemination of security threats, fraud, infringement of intellectual property rights, or the 
GLVWULEXWLRQRILOOHJDOFRQWHQW´ (OECD 2011: 3). Their role as gatekeeper made IIs clear targets 
for regulatory reform. East Coast codemakers wanted to encourage them to act in an editorial, 
self-regulatory role; to police and remove harmful content, while IIs wanted to remove any risk of 
being held liable for that same harmful content. 
 
In the USA, this issue came to a head with the decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Company 1995 WL 323710 whereby the New York Supreme Court ruled that IIs who 
assumed an editorial role with regard to customer content could be held liable as publishers, 
potentially making ISPs legally responsible in libel or tort for the actions of their users. This 
effectively discouraged IIs from self-regulating, an outcome which went against the intention of 
Congress. This led to the passing of s.230 of the Communications Decency Act 1996 (47 USC) 
which provides immunity for IIs operating in an editorial capacity. Unlike the controversial anti-
indecency provisions found in the Act that were later ruled unconstitutional, s.230 is still in force. 
It allows ISPs to restrict customer actions without fear of being found legally liable for their 
intervention. In Zeran v. America Online 129 F 3d 327 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted 
&RQJUHVV³HQDFWHGV.230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by the Stratton 
Oakmont GHFLVLRQ´ )HDULQJ WKis spectre of liability would deter ISPs from blocking and 
screening offensive material, Congress enacted s.230 "to remove disincentives for the 
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to 
restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material" (47 U.S.C. § 
230(b)(4)). Thus, s.230 was specifically passed to encourage IIs to play a regulatory role. 
 
In Europe regulators undertook a nuanced approach to IIs as gatekeeper regulators. The e-
Commerce Directive focused energies on notice-and-takedown, imposing liability for ISPs only 
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with attainment of actual knowledge of illegal content or activity (Art.14, Dir. 2000/31/EC). This 
approach has been fine-tuned through case law where courts have struggled to find a sense of 
proportionality that balances the rights of Internet users with litigants. In carrying out this 
unenviable task, courts have to balance not only rights of users against other rightsholders, 
within an acceptable framework for advocates of Internet freedoms that also complies with 
international standards. 
 
Searching for Proportionality 
 
Searching IRUµQXDQFH¶KDVOHGWRDVHULHVRIFDVHVLQWKH8.ZKHUHWKHFRXUWVH[DPLQHGYDULRXV
questions relating to the passivity of IIs in content moderation: for example, how involved in 
moderation does an II have to be before they lose their exemption from liability?7 What actually 
qualLILHVDVµQRWLFH¶XQGHU$UW14 of the e-Commerce Directive?8 And what is meant by the term 
µLQWHUPHGLDU\¶XQGHU WKH'LUHFWLYH"9 This search for nuance has had three effects. First, it has 
fragmented intermediary liability into subject-specific pockets of analysis. In Copyright Law, UK 
law has responded to immunity for conduits under Art.12 of the e-Commerce Directive by 
developing s.97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, a provision specifically 
designed to allow injunctions against IIs. Meanwhile, s.1 of the Defamation Act 1996, ss.5 & 10 
of the Defamation Act 2013 and the Regulations for Operators of Websites, when taken 
together provide a specific defence for the II if they can show that they did not post a 
defamatory statement.10 Secondly, there has been an additional series of cases so fact 
sensitive that it is hard to draw a line of authority in order to advise actors on how to structure 
their business.11 Finally, agreements outside formal legal frameworks occur without the 
oversight and transparency that one would normally expect from traditional state actors. For 
example, agreements between the UK government and major ISPs allow for the restriction of 
DFFHVV WR FRQWHQW GHHPHG SRUQRJUDSKLF XQOHVV D EURDGEDQG XVHU ³RSWV LQ´ ZLWK their ISP to 
access such content. The UK government has stated its intention to extend this regime to sites 
hosting extremist content (Clark 2014), while companies like BT have implemented wider 
content filtering systems under frameworks for of parental control, whereby new users must opt-
in to a variety of content, ranging from obscene content, to content featuring nudity, drugs and 
alcohol, self-harm and dating sites (BT, 2015). 
 
Since 2012 a series of orders pursuant to s.97A of the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 
1988 have been made by the English courts requiring ISPs to block or at least impede access to 
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websites that offer infringing content. Since the initial cases of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp 
v. British Telecommunications plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) and Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp v. British Telecommunications plc (No 2) [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), ISPs have not opposed 
a single blocking order sought by rights-holders. They have instead limited themselves to 
negotiating the wording of orders. To date there has not been a single appeal regarding the 
costs of the applications or the costs of implementing the orders.12 All section 97A orders 
relating to copyright have been obtained by film studios, record companies or by the FA Premier 
League. The courts have also allowed for a s.97A-style order to be made under s.37(1) of the 
Supreme Courts Act 1981 against a site selling mass quantities of trademark infringing goods.13 
Injunctions issued under s.97A (or s.37(1)) pose a new set of challenges for the courts, in large 
part due to Art.11 of the Enforcement Directive which requires that any remedies for relief be 
³HIIHFWLYH SURSRUWLRQDWH DQG GLVVXDVLYH´ DQG LPSOHPHQWHG LQ D ZD\ WKDW GRHV QRW FUHDWH
³EDUULHUV OHJLWLPDWH WUDGH´DQG ³VDIHJXDUGVDJDLQVWDEXVH´7KHFRXUWVPXVW WDNH LQWRDFFRXQW
the interests of third parties, particularly those consumers and private parties acting in good faith 
(Recital 24, Dir. 2004/48/EC). Taken together, Recital 24 and Article 3(2) of the Enforcement 
Directive (Dir. 2004/48/EC), and the ruling from the European Court of Justice in /¶2UHDO v. eBay 
[2012] All ER (EC) 501 UHTXLUH WKDWDQ\ LQMXQFWLRQVPXVWQRWRQO\EH³HIIHFWLYHSURSRUWLRQDWH
and dissuasive and must not create barriers to lHJLWLPDWHWUDGH´EXWDOVRPXVWKDYHUHJDUGWR
safeguards against abuse and interests of third parties.14 
 
Business Actors 
 
Major benefactors of increased regulation over IIs are arguably those who offer legal 
alternatives to the now regulated copyright infringing services. This has led to greater demand 
for legal services such as Spotify, Apple Music, Google Play Music or Amazon Prime Music for 
accessing and/or purchasing copyrighted music and Netflix, Hulu and Amazon Prime in the 
lucrative video market. The role of commerce in the governance of new and emerging 
technologies never has been more relevant. Companies like Dropbox, Spotify, and Netflix have 
developed their services in response to user frustrations with the digital environment. Dropbox, 
a cloud storage company, thrived by providing a user-friendly solution to secure off-line access 
to files from multiple devices while offering a product that circumvents limitations in capacity 
found in personal computer hardware. By summer 2015 the music service Spotify had grown to 
over 75 million users and over 20 million paying subscribers15 providing a legal streaming 
DOWHUQDWLYHWR$SSOH¶VL7XQHV download service. The success of Spotify eventually forced market 
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leaders in music downloads Apple, Google and Amazon to begin their own streaming services 
in competition. At the same time video service Netflix boasted over 65 million members in over 
50 countries enjoying more than 100 million hours of TV shows and movies per day.16 With 
growing popularity in cloud-based, legitimate and income generating media providers, it is 
unsurprising rights-holders continue to take steps to protect their intellectual property in the 
online environment. 
 
S.97A appears to be a powerful and V\PEROLF WRRO LQ WKH (DVW &RDVW FRGHPDNHU¶V DUVHQDO. 
Orders made under s.97A provide allow rights-holders to compel ISPs into becoming complicit 
deputies in their fight, whatever that fight might be. Intermediary gatekeepers, discussed so 
eloquently by Laidlaw, now arguably have dual roles: the gatekeeper is not only an independent 
regulator, enforcing their own moral or corporate values (as allowed by s.230), but is also a 
proxy - a mere tool or node in a larger regulatory matrix. In many cases the second category 
captures that most Lessigian act ± seizing and deployment of non-state actors by the state to 
protect wider political or commercial interests: West Coast Code has been enrolled by East 
Coast Code.17 
 
Transnational Multi-State Actors: The EU DG Competition 
 
Emerging Markets and Disruptive Innovation  
 
Governments, of course, remain engaged in the digital governance debate. The very premise of 
a chapter which discusses the role of non-state actors in the governance of emergent digital 
technologies is that state actors are still the primary regulators in this sphere. State actors may 
leverage control directly and indirectly and they play key roles in the private governance space 
through governmental advisory committees and policy committees. More directly governments 
through organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union or the African Union 
form supranational regulatory blocs. One area where the European Union has been particularly 
active in the field of new and emergent digital technologies is in competition abuses.  
 
New and emergent technologies are often disruptive in nature and as such pose a threat to 
established market participants. The risk to established market participants has been identified 
and discussed extensively in economics literature, especially by Clayton Christensen of Harvard 
Business School whose work The Innovator's Dilemma (Christensen 1997) has become the 
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foundational text in this discourse. In a contemporary attempt to modernise and give flesh to 
SchXPSHWHU¶VQRZGDWHGFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI FUHDWLYHGHVWUXFWLRQ (Schumpeter 1942: 81-87), 
Christensen replaces 6FKXPSHWHU¶VPDFURHFRQRPLFFRQFHSWRIDFROOapse of capitalism with a 
microeconomic business centred concept of disruptive innovation (Christensen 1997: 10-19). 
While Schumpeter is looking at the outcome of disruption, Christensen is looking at the causal 
mechanism. Christensen notes that while most technological innovations are sustaining 
LQQRYDWLRQV ³WHFKQRORJLHVWKDW >@ LPSURYH WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRf established products, along the 
dimensions of performance that mainstream customers in major markets have historically 
YDOXHG´ (Christensen 1997: 11) GLVUXSWLYHWHFKQRORJLHVDUHTXLWHGLIIHUHQW WKH\³UHVXOW LQZRUVH
product performance, at least in the near-term...they bring to a market a very different value 
proposition than had been available previously. Generally, disruptive technologies underperform 
established products in mainstream markets. But they have other features that a few fringe (and 
generalO\ QHZ FXVWRPHUV YDOXH´ (Christensen 1997: 11). In time these technologies become 
mainstream as more customers are attracted to the benefits the new technology offers. 
Meanwhile the operators of established technologies lose out as they fail to invest in the 
GLVUXSWLYHWHFKQRORJ\IRUWKUHHUHDVRQV³)LUVWGLVUXSWLYHSURGXFWVDUHVLPSOHUDQGFKHDSHUWKH\
generally promise lower margins, not greater profits. Second, disruptive technologies typically 
are first commercialized in emerging or insignificant marNHWV $QG WKLUG OHDGLQJ ILUPV¶ PRVW
SURILWDEOH FXVWRPHUV JHQHUDOO\ GRQ¶W ZDQW DQG LQGHHG LQLWLDOO\ FDQ¶W XVH SURGXFWV Eased on 
disruptive technologies´ (Christensen 1997: 12). As a result established firms fail and new 
entrants take over. We have seen this happen frequently with digital technologies. IBM and 
DEC, major mainframe manufacturers lost out to smaller and more nimble desktop computer 
manufacturers such as Dell, Wang and Apple in the 1980s; IBM lost out again to Microsoft in the 
operating system market, while more recently internet technologists such as Google, Adobe, 
Netflix and Spotify have disrupted a number of markets including web browsing, file storage, 
applications software, mobile operating systems, television and film and music distribution. It is 
unsurprising therefore that established market participants often take defensive positions vis-a-
vis new and emergent technologies which display disruptive characteristics. These defensive 
positions vary dependent upon the market and the new entrant. Often extensive patent thickets 
will be employed with dominant market participants patenting all aspects of their technology as 
has been seen in the Samsung v Apple series of cases fought globally over a number of patents 
LQFOXGLQJ WKH $SSOH  ³ERXQFH EDFN´ SDWHQW DQG WKH 6DPVXQJ  ³PXVLF PXOWLWDVNLQJ´
patent.18 An alternative strategy is to leverage market dominance in one technology market to 
achieve control or dominance over an emergent market. This strategy is employed usually when 
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the dominant player in one market wishes to move into a vertically related emerging market 
VXFKDV0LFURVRIW¶VDWWHPSWVWROHYHUDJHGRPLQDQFHLQWKHRSHUDWLQJV\VWHPVPDUNHWWRDFKLHYH
GRPLQDQFH LQ WKH ZHE EURZVHU PDUNHW RU *RRJOH¶V DWWHPSWV WR OHYHUDJH GRPLQDQFH LQ web 
search into vertical search, online advertising and mobile platforms. Unsurprisingly these 
attempts have drawn the attention of competition authorities in both the US and the EU and 
provide the perfect case study to analyse the regulatory activity of the EU directorate General 
for Competition as a multi-state, supranational, public regulatory body.  
 
Microsoft: Interoperability, Media Players and Web Browsers   
In the 1990s the disruptive innovation for operating system (OS) and applications software (AS) 
developers like Microsoft was web browsers. The risk was that anything which could be 
achieved through a personal computer could be achieved through a Network Computer 
connected to a server. The fruits of the Network Computer concept may be seen today in 
inexpensive and lightweight notebook computers such as the Google Chromebook, which 
operate using the Chrome Operating System, a variant of Linux, designed to be used with 
QHWZRUNDSSOLFDWLRQVVXFKDV*RRJOH¶VRQOLQHRIILFHVXLWH)RU0LFURVRIWWKHUHZDVDGXDOWKUHDW
browsers could challenge their dominance in the operating systems market while online 
applications could undermine their dominance in office applications software. Despite this 
threat, as Christensen could have predicted, Microsoft as the incumbent in the wider OS/AS 
markets was a slow adopter to web browsing technology. The first commercial web browser 
was the Netscape or Mosiac browser which in January 1994 was used by 97% of Internet 
users.19 Microsoft would not debut its browser, called Internet Explorer until August 1995 by 
which time Netscape Navigator, the replacement for Mosiac, was on its way to controlling nearly 
90% of the browser market.20 Remarkably though by October 1998 Internet Explorer would 
overtake Netscape Navigator to become the most popular web browser: in a little over three 
years Microsoft had gone from less than 4% of the browser market to 49.1%21 and in time 
Internet Explorer would go on to hold nearly 97% of the browser market.22 The story of how 
Microsoft achieved this is of course well known and is recorded by the findings of facts in United 
States v. Microsoft 253 F.3d 34 at >@³,QHDUO\SHUVRQQHOGHYHORSLQJ,QWHUQHWExplorer 
at Microsoft contemplated charging Original Equipment Manufacturers and others for the 
product when it was released. Internet Explorer would have been included in a bundle of 
software that would have been sold as an add-RQ RU µIURVWLQJ¶ WR :LQGRws 95. Indeed, 
Microsoft knew by the middle of 1995, if not earlier, that Netscape charged customers to license 
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Navigator, and that Netscape derived a significant portion of its revenue from selling browser 
licenses. Despite the opportunity to make a substantial amount of revenue from the sale of 
Internet Explorer, and with the knowledge that the dominant browser product on the market, 
Navigator, was being licensed at a price, senior executives at Microsoft decided that Microsoft 
needed to give its browser away in furtherance of the larger strategic goal of accelerating 
Internet Explorer's acquisition of browser usage share. Consequently, Microsoft decided not to 
charge an increment in price when it included Internet Explorer in Windows for the first time, and 
it has continued this policy ever since. In addition, Microsoft has never charged for an Internet 
([SORUHU OLFHQVH ZKHQ LW LV GLVWULEXWHG VHSDUDWHO\ IURP :LQGRZV´ $V 'LVWULFW -XGJH -DFNVRQ
QRWHV³RYHUWKHPRQWKVDQG\HDUVWKDWIROORZHGWKHUHOHDVHRI,nternet Explorer 1.0 in July 1995, 
senior executives at Microsoft remained engrossed with maximizing Internet Explorer's share of 
browser usage. Whenever competing priorities threatened to intervene, decision-makers at 
Microsoft reminded those reporting to them that browser usage share remained, as Microsoft 
VHQLRU YLFH SUHVLGHQW 3DXO 0DULW] SXW LW µMRE ¶´(US v. Microsoft: [138]) Applying this ethos 
Microsoft leveraged a 3.7% market share into a 96.6% market share in six and a half years. The 
infamous case of United States v. Microsoft examined both the bundling of Internet Explorer and 
Windows Media Player in the Windows OS. The outcome of this case, which took six years to 
final disposal (Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F. 3d 1199), was roundly criticised for not 
doing enough to prevent future abuses of dominance in the OS market by Microsoft (Chin 2005; 
Jenkins & Bing 2007). 
 
It is arguable that the outcome of the United States v Microsoft case represents a failure by the 
state to regulate one of its own citizens. However in addition to the US antitrust investigation the 
Commission of the European Union undertook a separate investigation. This investigation was 
begun in 1993 and related to the licensing of Windows OS, access to Windows OS application 
program interfaces (APIs) and the bundling of Windows Media Player. The initial investigation in 
Europe did not involve Internet Explorer but a later investigation did involve Internet Explorer 
bundling. The initial case was brought in 1998 and was an investigation of two breaches of 
Art.82 of the EC Treaty (now Art.102 TFEU), and Art.54 of the EEA Agreement: (1) refusing to 
supply interoperability information and allow its use for the purpose of developing and 
distributing work group server operating system products (the interoperability investigation); and 
(2) making the availability of the Windows Client PC Operating System conditional on the 
simultaneous acquisition of Windows Media Player (WMP) from May 1999 until the date of this 
Decision (the bundling investigation).23 The case is, of course extremely well known. Following a 
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five-year investigation the Commission found that Microsoft had a dominant position in both the 
group server OS market and the PC OS market. They further found Microsoft had abused both 
market dominances to leverage control into related markets, eventually fining Microsoft over 
¼PLOOLRQDOWKRXJKRYHU WLPHWKLVILQHKDV LQFUHDVHGFRQVLGHUDEO\GXHWR0LFURVRIW faling to 
comply in good time, ZLWKDQDGGLWLRQDOILQHRI¼PLOOLRQUHGXFHGRQDSSHDOWR¼PLOOLRQ
added in 2008.24 With a clear, and for Microsoft costly, precedent set that, for the purposes of 
former Art.82 of the EC Treaty bundling was unlawful the Commission opened up the entire 
market for software which operated on the Windows platform. When soon after the Commission 
announced that it was turning its attention to Internet Explorer bundling Microsoft immediately 
took action to ensure that it complied with (8 FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ E\ RIIHULQJ DQ ³(´ YHUVLRQ RI
Windows 7 which would unbundle Internet Explorer for distribution within the EU (Heiner 2009), 
DOWKRXJK LQ  0LFURVRIW ZHUH ILQHG DQ DGGLWLRQDO ¼ PLOOLRQ IRU IDLOXUH WR LPSOHPHQW
correctly and in good time the settlement agreed to in 2009.25 
 
The actions of the European Commission have generally been viewed as being much more 
VXFFHVVIXOWKDQWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQRIWKH86)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQWLQWR0LFURVRIW¶VDFWLYLWLHs. While 
the US antitrust case is viewed DVEHLQJOHVVHIIHFWLYHLQUHJXODWLQJ0LFURVRIW¶V OHYHUDJHRI LWV
dominant position in the OS market, the collected EU Competition actions are seen as effective 
interventions into especially the emergent streaming video and browser markets. Market share 
data seems to demonstrate that given a free choice the consumer chose not be tied to the 
Microsoft product. The global market share for Internet Explorer has fallen from nearly 97% in 
April 2002 to 17.2% today. In addition the market is much more open with no browser holding a 
clearly dominant position, the market leader Google Chrome holds 43%, Internet Explorer 
17.2%, Apple Safari 15.2%, Firefox 15.1% and Opera 3.1%.26 While much of this change in 
market share can be tracked to the emergence of new browsing technologies such as 
smartphones and tablets which make extensive use of Google and Apple operating systems 
(and hence a pre-eminence for Chrome and Safari on these products), there is no doubt the 
actions of the EU Commission helped create an environment where new (and existing) 
technologies such as Chrome and Safari could develop their product in the PC market before 
phone and tablet versions were developed. Figures for just desktop market share are harder to 
find but a 2014 report suggests that Internet Explorer, although still the dominant PC browser, is 
now only used by 58.4% of desktop internet users, with Chrome on 19.3%, Firefox on 15.5%, 
6DIDUL RQ  DQG 2SHUD RQ  ,QWHUQHW ([SORUHU¶V desktop pre-eminence seems to be a 
legacy issue with the most popular version of Internet Explorer in use being IE8, used by 21.2% 
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of users. This was the version released in 2009 which was bundled with Windows 7 outside the 
EU, and which according to the Commission was bundled to 15 million EU citizens in error.27 
There is little doubt that the browser market is much healthier today than in 2009. Equally data 
shows that the market for streaming video players is much healthier post the intervention of the 
Commission.28 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWK0LFURVRIWPD\KDve been critiqued by some 
free market thinkers (Economides & Lianos 2009; Ahlborn & Evans 2009) but there seems little 
doubt that by cutting back the leveraged vertical dominance of Microsoft they have allowed new 
entrants and new technologies to flourish in what may not be sexy but are important everyday 
markets.  
 
Transnational Standards and Private Actors: ICANN 
ICANN 
When one thinks of a transnational private actor in the digital environment, one invariably thinks 
of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is a high-profile 
private regulator with global reach. It was formed in 1998 to take over management of the root 
domain name space which meant ICANN became responsible for the allocation of Internet 
Protocol (IP) address spaces to regional registrars and for the management of generic Top 
Level Domains (gTLDs) such as .com, .net and .org. This was all achieved by the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the United States government which transferred to ICANN 
the so called IANA function of assigning internet address blocks previously under the 
management of the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California 
(Mueller 1999). ICANN was the conscious creation of a private multistakeholder regulator to 
replace the old system of public/private governance (NTIA 1998) ,Q WKH\HDUVVLQFH ,&$11¶V
creation it has grown to be an effective, although controversial, multistakeholder regulator. 
Despite initial criticism that it was unrepresentative (Mueller 1998; Froomkin 2001) and lacked 
legitimacy (Froomkin 2000) ICANN has withstood a number of challenges, including a sustained 
challenge to its role at the 2005 WSIS summit in Tunis (Pickard 2007), and today despite 
ongoing challenges seems to be secure in its role as the established global regulator not only of 
the IANA function and the root Domain Name System or DNS, but of domain name policy more 
generally (Take 2012). 
 18 
 
Generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs) and the .xxx controversy 
One policy area continually debated by ICANN and stakeholders is the creation of new gTLDs. 
These are thought to be necessary due to a paucity of available addressing options in the 
domain name structure. The limited number of gTLDs (in 1998 when ICANN was formed there 
were only three open gTLds .com, .org and .net) meant that once someone had registered say 
apple.com it was unavailable for anyone else. This meant once Apple Inc. had registered this 
address it was no longer available for Apple Records or Apple Bank (Murray 1998). The scarcity 
of available domain name space meant the push for a greater number of gTLDs to alleviate 
pressure on the ever expanding use of the DNS is older than ICANN. In 1997 the International 
Ad-Hoc Committee (part of IANA the forerunner to ICANN) proposed seven new gTLDs 
LQFOXGLQJILUPVWRUHDQGZHEDV³WKH'16ZDVODFNLQJZKHQLWFRPHVWRUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHIXOO
VFRSHRIWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGLQGLYLGXDOVRQWKHLQWHUQHW´ (Gibbs 1997). These proposals were 
abandoned when ICANN took over management of the DNS but in November 2000, following a 
short public consultation, it announced seven new gTLDs of its own: .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, 
.museum, .name, and .pro. They were quickly criticised for being, with the exception of .biz, too 
narrow in reach (Levine 2005; Nicholls 2013) and ten years later an analysis of the .biz gTLD 
found it too had failed to meet its policy objectives (Halvorson et al 2012). Despite this ICANN 
continued to introduce a drip of gTLDs including six more between 2004 and 2007 and another 
in 2012. During this time the major controversy was over the .xxx proposal. This was a proposal 
for an adult space on the internet delineated by a .xxx gTLD, proposed by ICM Registry in 2004. 
Initially ICANN approved the application but in the aftermath of this decision national 
JRYHUQPHQWVEHFDPHHQJDJHG WKURXJK ,&$11¶V*RYHUQPHQW$GYLVRU\&RPPLWWHH *$& DQ
advisory committee formed of representatives of all UN member states and a number of 
supranational organisations including the African Union and the European Commission, 
supplemented by a number of observers from multinational organisations including the 
European Broadcasting Union and the International Telecommunications Union.  
Initially it appeared members of the GAC had no objections to the .xxx proposal. A letter from 
*$& FKDLU 0RKDPHG 6KDULO 7DUPL]L LQ $SULO  KDG VWDWHG ³>Q@R *$& PHPEHUV KDYH
expressed specific reservations or comments in the GAC, about the applications for sTLDs in 
WKHFXUUHQWURXQG´29 This though quickly changed. Under pressure from groups like the Family 
Research Council and Focus on the Family, the US Government hardened a stance against 
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.xxx. This was quickly followed by objections from Australia, the UK, Brazil, Canada, Sweden, 
the European Commission and many others. As a result in May 2006 ICANN withdrew their 
approval. There are many ways to view this. It can be seen as a success for the 
multistakeholder model in that an initial decision of the ICANN Board taken following limited 
consultation was reversed following action from civil society groups and discourse by 
representatives of democratic governance in the GAC. In the alternative it could be viewed as a 
failure by ICANN to represent the wider community and the variety of stakeholders with an 
interest in liberalisation of the gTLD space. In the first major challenge to the ICANN 
multistakeholder model national governments had flexed their muscles and had won the day. As 
-RQDWKDQ:HLQEHUJVWDWHV ³1DWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVKDGEHFRPH involved with the issue late in 
the day, but their objections were powerful...empowered by that experience, GAC members 
VRXJKWWRPDNHWKHLUYLHZVNQRZQPRUHEURDGO\´ (Weinberg 2011: 203); certainly there was a 
prevailing view that ICANN had allowed themselves to be dominated by the GAC in this 
exchange (Weinberg 2011; Mueller 2010: 71-3; Berkman Centre 2010). Perhaps fortuitously 
ICANN had previously agreed to arbitration should there be any challenges to their decisions 
and ICM took advantage of this to challenge the decision. The eventual decision of the 
International Center for Dispute Resolution in February 2010 found that ICANN had been wrong 
to reverse their decision (ICM v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08, 19 February 
2010). They found that I&$11KDGDGXW\WR³RSHUDWHIRUWKHEHQHILWRIWKH,QWHUQHWFRPPXQLW\
as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law 
DQGDSSOLFDEOHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQYHQWLRQVDQGORFDOODZ´WKDW³WKH%RDUGRI,&$11LQDdopting its 
resolutions of June 1, 2005, found that the application of ICM Registry for the .XXX sTLD met 
WKHUHTXLUHGVSRQVRUVKLSFULWHULD´DQGYLWDOO\WKDW³WKH%RDUG¶VUHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKDWILQGLQJZDV
not consistent with the application of neutral, oEMHFWLYH DQG IDLU GRFXPHQWHG SROLF\´ (ICM v. 
ICANN: [152]). 7KH\ DOVR WDFLWO\ VXSSRUWHG ,&0¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW ³>,&$11@ UHMHFWHG ,&0¶V
application on grounds that were not applied neutrally and objectively, which were suggestive of 
DSUHWH[WXDOEDVLV WR µFRYHU¶ WKH UHDO UHDVRQ IRU UHMHFWLQJ ;;; LH WKDW WKH86JRYHUQPHQW
DQGVHYHUDORWKHUSRZHUIXOJRYHUQPHQWVREMHFWHGWRLWVSURSRVHGFRQWHQW´ (ICM v. ICANN: [89]). 
As a result of this ICANN reviewed the decision, and in March 2011 ICANN approved the .xxx 
domain.  
The New gTLD Process 
The fallout from the .xxx case was felt acutely in the next stage of domain name liberalisation, 
WKHFUHDWLRQRI³1HZJ7/'V´DSURFHVVIRUPDOO\EHJXQLQ. It reached fruition in 2011 when 
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the ICANN Board agreed to allow applications for New gTLDs from any interested party upon 
payment of a substantial management fee.30 To date over 500 New gTLDs have been 
approved,31 and they fall mostly into four categories: trademarks such as .cartier, .toshiba and 
.barclays; geographical such as .vegas, .london and .sydney; vocational such as .pharmacy, 
.realtor and .attorney and speculative such as .beer, .porn and .poker.32 Learning from their 
experience in the .xxx controversy ICANN approached the New gTLD process differently. Firstly 
an attempt by some members of the GAC to regain control over the approval process was met 
head on. An attempt by the Obama administration to secure for the US and other GAC 
members a veto right against New gTLD applications (McCullagh 2011) was deflected by 
ICANN who refused to act on the proposal. Instead ICANN reaffirmed the process which had 
been previously agreed; a proposal which ultimately met with agreement of most members of 
the GAC.33 To meet both the concerns of allowing an open registration process, which allows 
any string of letters or characters to be registered, and the .xxx concern, the New gTLD 
registration process has two safeguards. The first is that once an application is made there is a 
period during which objections against grant may be lodged on one of four grounds: string 
confusion (where the applied for name is confusingly similar to an already in use or applied for 
string, such as .bom or .cam); legal rights objections (where the name is confusingly similar to a 
legal trademark or right in a name, such as .coach or .merck); community objections (where a 
challenge may be brought by representatives of a community to whom the name is impliedly or 
implicitly addressed, such as .amazon or .patagonia); and finally and vitally for our analysis a 
limited public interest challenge which may be brought where the gTLD string is contrary to 
generally accepted legal norms of morality and public order that are recognized under principles 
of international law. Each objection gives rise to an arbitration process with the WIPO Arbitration 
and Mediation Centre dealing with legal rights objections; the International Center for Dispute 
Resolution dealing with string confusion objections and the International Center of Expertise of 
the International Chamber of Commerce dealing with both community and public interest 
challenges. New gTLDs cannot be awarded until they have either passed the period for 
objection without any objection being lodged or the applicant has been successful at arbitration. 
Any interested party with standing, including GAC members, can bring challenges. As with the 
.xxx case arbitration was seen as the best way to settle disputes, and as with the longstanding 
dispute resolution procedure, independent arbiters are preferred. The second safeguard was 
WKHFUHDWLRQDQGDSSRLQWPHQWRIDQ³,QGHSHQGHQW2EMHFWRU´7KLVZDVDQRIILFHFUHDWHGVROHO\WR
serve the best interests of global Internet users. The Independent Objector could lodge 
objections in cases where no other objection has been filed but only on limited public interest 
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and community grounds. The appointed Objector was Professor Alain Pellett and he lodged 
twenty-three such objections ranging from .amazon to .health. He prevailed in five claims, lost in 
fourteen and four claims were withdrawn.  
The New gTLD process is clearly a refinement of the processes used in previous rounds of 
gTLD creation. There have been a number of critiques of ICANN that have drawn into question 
its legitimacy. Many of these have focussed upon its processes for renewing and reforming the 
DNS. Claims made by critics include that ICANN, despite being set up as a multistakeholder 
regulator, has been too narrow in approach, unresponsive to criticism and undemocratic in 
action (Mueller 1999; Froomkin 2000; Froomkin 2001; Pickard 2007; Koppell 2005). Fears about 
undue influence of GAC members remain to this day (Mueller & Kuerbis 2014), but the New 
gTLD process, although not without flaws (Froomkin 2013), is clearly more inclusive of the wider 
internet community and stakeholders outside of the usual closed group of ICANN board 
members, GAC members and trademark holders. Objections have come from diverse interest 
groups such as the International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association and the 
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of Americas, member associations such as the 
Universal Postal Union and the International Union of Architects, political associations including 
the Republican National Committee and local interest groups including the Hong Kong 
CommitWHHRQ&KLOGUHQ¶V5LJKWV$OOWKHVHFKDOOHQJHVDUHLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHFKDOOHQJHVEURXJKW
by the Independent Objector and the large number of challenges brought by commercial entities 
as well as the limited number brought by national governments and public authorities. As noted 
at the outset of this section the importance and value of domain names as a tool for identity as 
well as addressing mean they play a vital role in emergent online offerings. All too often we think 
of new and emergent technologies in terms of hardware or innovative services. The 
development of the DNS from 1998 onwards has been a vital component of the development of 
the Web and mobile content and ICANN have played a vital role in this. The importance and 
value of the DNS is exactly why they are such a controversial regulator. Much improvement is 
still clearly required of them but the new gLTD process is arguably a move in the right direction.   
 
Civil Society Groups: Data Retention  
Data Retention, Proportionality and Civil Society  
 
The EU Data Retention Directive (Dir. 2006/24/EC) sought to harmonize EU 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
SURYLVLRQV ³FRQFHUQLQJ WKH REOLJDWLRQV RI WKH SURYLGHUV RI SXEOLFO\ DYDLODEOH HOHFWURQLF
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FRPPXQLFDWLRQVVHUYLFHVRURISXEOLFFRPPXQLFDWLRQVQHWZRUNV´ with regards to data retention 
for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime (Data Retention 
Directive. Art.1(1)). Under Art.10 of the Directive, Member States are required to provide 
statistics relating to the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or a public communications 
network. These statistics include: the cases in which information was provided to the competent 
authorities in accordance with applicable national law; the time elapsed between the date on 
which the data were retained and the date on which the competent authority requested the 
transmission of the data; and the cases where requests for data could not be met.34 
 
Given the rapid advance in technology, concerns for what amounted to sufficient legal 
safeguards remained unclear. After an advocacy group called Access to Information Program 
(AIP) initiated an action, the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) annulled Art.5 of 
WKH %XOJDULDQ 5HJXODWLRQ  ZKLFK SURYLGHG IRU D ³SDVVLYH DFFHVV WKURXJK D FRPSXWHU
WHUPLQDO´ E\ WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI ,QWHULRU DV ZHOO DV DFFHVV ZLWKRXW FRXUW SHUPLVVLRQ E\ VHFXULW\
services and other law enforcement bodies, to all retained data by Internet and mobile 
communication providers. The SAC annulled the article, considering that the provision did not 
set any limitations with regard to the data access by a computer terminal and did not provide for 
any guarantees for the protection of the right to privacy stipulated by Art.32(1) of the Bulgarian 
Constitution. In Romania a challenge to Law 298/2008, the Romanian implementing provision, 
IRXQGWKDW³WKHSURYLVLRQVRI/DZQRUHJDUGLQJWKHUHWHQWLRQRI the data generated or 
processed by the public electronic communications service providers or public network 
providers, as well as the modification of law 506/2004 regarding the personal data processing 
and protection of private life in the field of electronic communication area are not 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO´35 After over 30,000 German citizens brought a class action suit, Germany's 
highest court suspended its implementation of the Directive by ruling that it violated FLWL]HQV¶ 
rights to privacy.36 Finally, a constitutional challenge was raised in the Irish courts, brought by 
another advocacy group, Digital Rights Ireland, challenging the entire European legal basis for 
data retention (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources (C-293/12) [2014] All E.R. (EC) 775). 
 
The EU responded with data retention reform plans to reduce and harmonize the data retention 
period: It noted ³[a]pproximately, 67% of data is requested within three months and 89% within 
VL[ PRQWKV´ (EU Commission 2013: 7). Additionally, there was an increase in the types and 
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scope of data to be retained, minimum standards for access and use of data, stronger data 
protection, and a consistent approach to reimbursing operators' costs.37 Meanwhile the Irish 
Government attempted to discontinue the Irish action by seeking security for costs requiring 
payment into court to cover the costs of the State should they lose. Because of the high cost of 
High Court actions requiring such a payment at the outset could have effectively prevented the 
case from being heard. The CRXUWUHMHFWHGWKH6WDWH¶VDSSOLFDWLRQKROGLQJWKDW³JLYHQWKHUDSLG
advance of current technology it is of great importance to define the legitimate legal limits of 
modern surveillance techniques used by gRYHUQPHQWV«without sufficient legal safeguards the 
SRWHQWLDOIRUDEXVHDQGXQZDUUDQWHGLQYDVLRQRISULYDF\LVREYLRXV«7KDWLVQRWWRVD\WKDWWKLV
is the case here, but the potential is in my opinion so great that a greater scrutiny of the 
proposed legislaWLRQ LV FHUWDLQO\ PHULWHG´ (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for 
Communication & Ors [2010] IEHC 221: [108]).  
 
Transparency and Civil Society 
 
In the fallout from the Snowden revelations regulation of intelligence and surveillance agencies 
is slowly being increased, albeit not necessarily at the pace that privacy advocates would like. A 
right to privacy may not yet have the same bite as normally associated with other fundamental 
rights, but SUHVVXUHWRUHVSRQGWRFLYLOVRFLHW\¶VEDUNKDVSOayed an increasingly important role in 
checking the abuse of runaway state power. There have been a number of legal challenges at 
the European Court of Human Rights by civil society groups ranging from surveillance 
challenges to demands to the release documents detailing the spying agreements between the 
µFive Eyes¶ partners (Big Brother Watch & Ors. v. UK ECtHR App. 58170/13; Bernh Larson 
Holdings v. Norway, ECtHR App. 24117/08; Liberty & Ors. v. The Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs & Ors. [2015] 1 Cr App R 24). At the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) civil society have successfully challenged the legal regime governing 
data retention (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources (C-293/12) [2014] All E.R. (EC) 775) and, as seen have had considerable influence 
over domestic, implementing, legislation. The Open Rights Group (ORG) along other European 
societies has led domestic campaigns forcing governments to rethink their approaches to 
domestic surveillance or programmes that do not embrace or understand how they may 
compromise fundamental rights. The German Constitutional Court partially upheld a complaint 
WKDW WKH SROLFH DXWKRULWLHV¶ DXGLR VXUYHLOODQFH RI D KRPH D ODUJH-scale eavesdropping attack) 
breached fundamental rights; finding that any breach of a constitutional right on the basis of IT 
 24 
security requires factual evidence indicating a specific threat to an outstanding and overriding 
legal interest and judicial authorisation.38 
Civil society has also played a role in moderating legitimate actions by the state to regulate 
content. In 2014 the British government demanded that ISPs and mobile phone companies 
made a change in their choice architecture to restrict access to adult content. Access to content 
WKDW LV SRUQRJUDSKLF ZRXOG EH EORFNHG XQOHVV D EURDGEDQG XVHU ³RSWV LQ´ ZLWK LWV SURYLGHU WR
access such sites. Major ISPs implemented a filtering programme, marketing the programme as 
µSDUHQWDO FRQWUROV¶ ZKHUHE\ XVHUV PXVW RSW-in to a variety of content, ranging from obscene 
content, to content featuring nudity, drugs and alcohol, self-harm and dating sites. However, 
blocking systems tend not to work quite as well as was intended; filters designed to stop 
pornography also block sex education, sexual health and advice sites.  Parental reliance on 
blocking can result in derogation of parental responsibility. Overreliance on a web-filtering 
programme often assumes that nothing is going to get through resulting in the misguided 
assumption by a parent that their child is safe. Civil society engaged in petitions to moderate the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VVWDQFHDQGWRKHOS,63VHQJDJHZLWKXVHUVZKRPD\EHDIIHFWHGE\WKHLUGHFLVLRQ
to change the default rule. Groups like 451 Unavailable and Blocked.org.uk have help highlight 
the problem of web blocking, and have encouraged courts to publish blocking orders to increase 
WUDQVSDUHQF\ $V D UHVXOW RI WKLV W\SH RI DGYRFDF\ WKH 8. FRXUWV DGRSWHG 25*¶V
recommendations that any blocking orders should be required to have safeguards against 
DEXVH DQG DV D FRQVHTXHQFH DGRSWHG 25*¶V SURSRVDOV DERXW ODQGLQJ SDJHV DQG ³VXQVHW
FODXVHV´DVVDIHJXDUGVDJDLQVWDEXVH 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter elucidates roles and relationships of non-state actors in governance of the online 
environment. In doing so, it examines reasons for that role and discusses the utility and 
legitimacy of the relationship with traditional Westphalian forms of governance. The chapter also 
pays some attention to the equivalent role of law, charting its interaction with non-state actors. 
Its basic premise is that non-state actors play such a key part in regulation of cyberspace that 
the latter cannot be properly understood without explaining the frameworks in which they reside. 
At the same time, we have attempted to contribute to the legal and regulatory discussion about 
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the legitimacy of regulatory roles non-state actors play. Accordingly, there is increasing 
awareness of the power embedded within non-state actors and the need for on-going 
assessment of the balance of power between private and public bodies generally.  
 
On another level the chapter also seeks to address the non-VWDWH DFWRU¶V UROH LQ µPHWD-
UHJXODWLRQ¶- their coordination in networks with markets and governments. The extent of the role 
of the non-state actors attracts critical analysis; accordingly, there is growing awareness that the 
regulatory regimes for Internet regulation have an inherent complexity that is difficult to 
comprehend. This poses significant challenges for regulators and engenders legal uncertainty, 
but also creates opportunities for abuses of power by non-state actors. For Teubner privatized 
rulemaking continues to H[HUW ³PDVVLYH DQG XQILOWHUHG LQIOXHQFH RI SULYDWH LQWHUHVWV LQ ODZ
PDNLQJ´DQGis characterised DV³VWUXFWXUDOFRUUXSWLRQ´ (Teubner 2004: 3, 21). For others private 
ordering remains the most legitimate and effective means of regulating the online environment 
(Post & Johnson 1996: 1390-1; Easterbrook 1996). The role of the non-State actor will continue 
for the foreseeable future to remain the subject of critique. 
 
The ascendency of non-state actors is a hallmark of the online environment. The largesse of the 
non-VWDWH DFWRU¶V FRQTXHVW LV SHUKDSV PRVW VWULNLQJO\ GHPRQVWUDWHG E\ LWV LQYDVLRQ of 
cyberspace. Legal scholars will continue to examine the relationships prevalent in cyberspace, 
not only relationships between private corporations, but also relationships that govern 
relationships between government agencies and non-state actors.  These apply particularly to 
relationships between private sector actors (in the form of business-to-business (B2B) or 
business-to-consumers (B2C) relationships, and secondarily, to relationships between private 
actors and government bodies (in the form of business-to-government). Taken together they 
help to embed the emergence of recent macro-UHJXODWRU\ WHUPV OLNH ³QRGDO JRYHUQDQFH´
³,QWHUQHWJRYHUQDQFH´DQG³WUDQVQDWLRQDOSULYDWHUHJXODWLRQ´ (Braithwaite 2008; Abbott & Sindal 
2009; Calliess & Zumbansen 2010; Cafaggi 2011). 
 
As we have attempted to show, ICANN is an illustration par excellence of the complexity and 
dynamics of a transnational private regulator. The organisation of ICANN is also intricate and 
difficult to decipher (Bygrave & Michaelsen 2009: 106-10). This reflects the cornucopia of 
VWDNHKROGHUVWKDWPDNHXS,&$11¶VUDLVRQG¶HWUH and its commitment to policy-making through 
broad consensus. An enduring criticism of ICANN is the lack of appeal processes to another 
body with the power to overturn them. Although a policy proposal may emerge with broad 
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DJUHHPHQWIURPWKHFRQVWLWXHQFLHVFRQFHUQHGLWLVWKH,&$11%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQDORQHWRDGRSW
or reject the proposal.39 Although several mechanisms exist for reviewing Board decisions, none 
of these create legally binding outcomes (Weber & Gunnarson 2013: 11-12). Non-commercial 
user constituencies at ICANN exist solely to curb the influence of those stakeholders at ICANN 
that maintain considerable economic and political clout. Their function is to carve out a space for 
individual rights and individual registrants against excessive claims by rights-owners and 
governments. For example, the Non-commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) spent seven 
weeks in negotiations with other Stakeholder Groups to try to balance the rights of intellectual 
property owners with those of new and small businesses, other non-commercial entities, various 
users and the registry/registrar communities. 
7KH 1&6* LV RQO\ RQH H[DPSOH RI FLYLO VRFLHW\¶V UROH LQ µFKHFNLQJ¶ PRUH WUDGLWLRQal power 
structures. Civil society is no longer just a term used to aggregate non-governmental and non-
commercial entities together. Groups like Privacy International, the Open Rights Group, and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation exist to ensure accountability exists on two levels: organizational 
accountability to the stated purpose and function of the actor, and procedural accountability to 
the behaviour and actions of internal management. Arguably, the increased role of civil society 
has come about in resSRQVHWRDQLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURIOHJDODJUHHPHQWVIDOOLQJXQGHUWKHµVRIW
ODZ¶ XPEUHOOD DZD\ IURP WUDGLWLRQDO VWDWXWRU\ LQVWUXPHQWV $V D UHVXOW WKHUH LV DQ LQKHUHQW
difficulty in establishing clear legal lines as to what legal instrument regulates what actor in the 
online environment. Soft law measures have incredible influence in changing established 
revenue streams (consider our earlier discussion on the financial consequences for a site 
blocked by a S97A order) or basic human rights (consider legislation on data privacy). The 
fluidity of political constellations can also force a change to the way civil society interacts with 
other actors in the online environment (for example, the replacement of the Joint Project 
Agreement between the US government and ICANN by the Affirmation of Commitments). 
6RPHWLPHV FLYLO VRFLHW\ ZLOO EH LQVWUXPHQWDO LQ SXVKLQJ EDFN DJDLQVW µVRIW ODZ¶ PHDVXUHV
deployed by and over non-state actors. Sometimes soft law helps to shape the continuing 
nuances of online communication. While the Internet is said by some to be the great facilitator of 
freedom of expression, governments are constantly seeking to limit this right in line with the 
demands of their citizens; for example, passing measures to combat Internet facilitated crime 
unique to the modern era like cyberbullying, trolling and revenge porn. However, we find 
RXUVHOYHV FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW ZKHQHYHU UHJXODWRUV QHHGHG µKDUG ODZ¶ WR H[HUFLVH ILQH-grained 
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control tailored to the needs of a particular platform, service, or online community, contract law 
is most often deployed. Statutory forms of control over non-state actors remains largely an 
RSWLRQ RI µODVW UHVRUW¶, used mostly in an indirect fashion and designed to leverage control 
through the structural features of either the network or the market. This is seen in our study 
through the activities of the EU Directorate-General for Competition in regulating the market for 
media players and internet browsers, and represented currently by the DG-COMP investigations 
into Google. Such interventions remain rare and given their complexity and costs are only 
exercised where all other solutions have run out. Non-state, decentred and intermediary control 
are likely to remain at the heart of online regulation and governance for some time to come.  
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